Bond Economics
Bonds are the financial foundation of TOC's accountability system. They create skin in the game for resolvers and disputers, ensuring economic incentives align with accurate outcomes.
Three Bond Types
Posted by the proposer when submitting an answer. Backs the accuracy of the proposed resolution.
Posted by disputer to challenge an answer. Must exceed the resolution bond.
Posted to challenge TruthKeeper's Round 1 decision. Higher than Round 1 bonds.
Why Bonds Matter
Bonds solve the "cheap talk" problem in decentralized systems:
- Resolution quality - Proposers only submit answers they're confident in
- Dispute filtering - Higher bond requirement filters frivolous challenges
- Escalation cost - Expensive to challenge TruthKeeper unless truly incorrect
- Economic alignment - Everyone has financial stake in correct outcomes
The 50/50 Slash Mechanism
When bonds are slashed, they're split evenly:
dispute filing
operations
Why 50/50?
- Winner incentive - Makes it profitable to catch incorrect resolutions
- Protocol sustainability - Provides revenue for ongoing development
- Collusion prevention - No way to extract value through coordinated disputes
- Simplicity - Easy to understand and predict outcomes
Bond Flow Scenarios
Scenario 1: No Dispute
1. Proposer posts resolution bond
2. Dispute window passes without challenge
3. Result finalized
4. Proposer bond returned in full
Scenario 2: Dispute Upheld (Disputer Wins)
1. Proposer posts resolution bond (100 ETH)
2. Disputer posts dispute bond (120 ETH)
3. TruthKeeper upholds dispute
4. Disputer receives: 120 ETH (refund) + 50 ETH (from proposer) = 170 ETH
5. Protocol receives: 50 ETH
Scenario 3: Dispute Rejected (Proposer Wins)
1. Proposer posts resolution bond (100 ETH)
2. Disputer posts dispute bond (120 ETH)
3. TruthKeeper rejects dispute
4. Proposer receives: 100 ETH (refund) + 60 ETH (from disputer) = 160 ETH
5. Protocol receives: 60 ETH
Scenario 4: POP Cancelled
1. Dispute filed
2. TruthKeeper or Admin cancels POP (ambiguous, force majeure, etc.)
3. Both bonds returned in full
4. POP enters CANCELLED state
Bond Requirements
Minimum Amounts
The protocol sets minimum bond amounts for each type. These can be configured per token:
// Admin configures acceptable bonds
registry.addAcceptableResolutionBond(
address(0), // ETH
0.1 ether // minimum amount
);
registry.addAcceptableDisputeBond(
address(0),
0.15 ether // must exceed resolution bond
);
registry.addAcceptableEscalationBond(
address(0),
0.25 ether // higher for Round 2
);
Supported Tokens
- Native ETH -
address(0) - ERC20 tokens - Stablecoins, governance tokens, etc.
POPs can accept bonds in any configured token. The token used for resolution bond determines the token for the entire dispute chain.
Bond-Free Resolution
If both dispute windows are set to 0, no bond is required:
// Create undisputable POP - no bond needed
registry.createPOP(
resolver,
templateId,
payload,
0, // disputeWindow = 0
0, // postResolutionWindow = 0
0, // truthKeeperWindow (unused)
0, // escalationWindow (unused)
address(0) // no TruthKeeper needed
);
Use with caution: Undisputable POPs have no accountability mechanism. Only use for trusted resolvers or low-stakes applications.
Escalation Bond Mechanics
Round 2 escalation has higher stakes:
- Escalation bond must exceed both Round 1 bonds
- Challenger risks losing escalation bond if admin rejects challenge
- If challenge succeeds, challenger receives 50% of opponent's Round 1 bond
This creates a filtering effect - only serious challenges make it to admin review.
Multi-Token Support
TOC supports multiple tokens for bonds, providing flexibility:
// Resolve with ETH bond
registry.resolvePOP{value: 0.1 ether}(
popId,
proposedResult,
address(0), // ETH
0.1 ether
);
// Or with ERC20 (requires approval first)
usdc.approve(address(registry), 100e6);
registry.resolvePOP(
popId,
proposedResult,
address(usdc), // USDC
100e6 // 100 USDC
);
Economic Guarantees
The bond system provides several guarantees:
- Non-negative expected value for honest actors - Correct resolutions keep their bond
- Negative expected value for dishonest actors - Incorrect resolutions lose bonds
- Profitable dispute filing - 50% reward makes catching errors worthwhile
- Protocol sustainability - 50% fee ensures ongoing development
Design note: Bond amounts should be calibrated to the value at stake. High-value settlements need larger bonds to ensure adequate deterrence against manipulation.